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Corporate profits versus spending on non-communicable 
disease prevention: an unhealthy balance
Tobacco, alcohol, and the overconsumption of 
unhealthy foods are responsible for approximately half 
of all premature non-communicable disease (NCD) 
deaths.1 Transnational companies play an important role 
in driving increasing consumption of these unhealthy 
commodities in the global south.2 Fully implementing 
the NCD Best Buys, as described by WHO, in low-income 
and middle-income countries would cost an estimated 
US$11·4 billion.3 How does this compare to industry 
profits?
We used the 2017 Forbes Global 2000 report to extract 
financial data for publicly listed transnational companies 
that sell tobacco, alcohol, and processed food. We 
included the four largest fast-food retailers, two major 
soft drinks companies, and every company in the top 
ten of the tobacco, alcohol, and processed food sectors 
for which financial data were publicly available (nine 
of the top ten in each sector had data available). For 
a random 10% sample of the included companies we 
cross-checked the data with annual financial reports; 
the Forbes figures were accurate in all cases.
Combined sales for the 33 included companies totalled 
US$829 billion in 2017. The companies are all based 
in high-income countries, with the exception of the 
Indonesian tobacco manufacturer Gudang. Total profits 
were $99 billion (which is twice the GDP of Ghana) and 
mean sector profitability ranged from 7% for processed 
foods to 29% for tobacco (figure).
Although the market share and sector sales figures 
are illuminating, the most striking finding is that 
a handful of companies command resources that 
are orders of magnitude larger than those required 
for NCD prevention and control. Coca-Cola spends 
approximately $4 billion on marketing each year,4 
which is more than the public health budget for 
many low-income and middle-income countries, 
and US tobacco firms spend $1 million per hour on 
advertising.5
Figure: Sales figures for 33 leading transnational corporations in 2017 by sector
















































































For the Forbes Global 2000 
report see https://www.forbes.
com/global2000
This online publication has 
been corrected. The corrected 




e1483 www.thelancet.com/lancetgh   Vol 7   November 2019
In the vernacular of economics, the consumption 
of tobacco, alcohol, junk food, and sugar-sweetened 
beverages leads to negative externalities—ecological, 
economic, social, and health costs that are borne by 
third parties. These products also constitute so-called 
demerit goods, because their use also harms the user. 
Demerit goods tend to be overconsumed when left to 
market forces. Governments can (but often do not) 
respond by introducing taxes and other policy measures, 
such as the cheap and effective WHO Best Buys.3
Our data highlight the fact that the sale of these 
products is extremely lucrative. These transnational 
companies have a substantial interest in maintaining 
the status quo. They design and advertise their products 
in ways that exploit biological, psychological, and social 
vulnerabilities,6 and undermine policy implementation 
through lobbying and political financing.7–9 Companies 
often frame public health policies as wasteful and 
ineffective assaults on personal freedoms that harm jobs 
and the national economy.10
Policy makers should acknowledge that, although 
tighter state intervention constrains short-term 
preferences (commonly decried as government over-
reach or nanny-statism), measures to reduce tobacco 
addiction, alcohol use, and consumption of unhealthy 
foods are widely popular; they align with people’s 
longer-term preferences for long and healthy lives and 
increase net welfare through health gains.
*Luke N Allen, Arian Hatefi, Andrea B Feigl
Nuffield Department of Primary Care Health Sciences, University 
of Oxford, Oxford OX2 6GG, UK (LNA); Division of Hospital 
Medicine, Department of Medicine, Institute for Global Health 
Sciences, University of California San Francisco, San Francisco, CA, 
USA (AH); and Department of Global Health and Population, 
Harvard T H Chan School of Public Health, Boston, MA, USA (ABF) 
luke.allen@phc.ox.ac.uk
We declare no competing interests. We thank Joseph Dieleman from the Institute 
for Health Metrics and Evaluation (Seattle, WA, USA) for his contribution.
Copyright © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an Open 
Access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
1 GBD 2015 Risk Factors Collaborators. Global, regional, and national 
comparative risk assessment of 79 behavioural, environmental and 
occupational, and metabolic risks or clusters of risks, 1990-2015: 
a systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2015. Lancet 
2016; 388: 1659–724.
2 Stuckler D, McKee M, Ebrahim S, Basu S. Manufacturing epidemics: 
the role of global producers in increased consumption of unhealthy 
commodities including processed foods, alcohol, and tobacco. PLoS Med 
2012; 9: e1001235.
3 WHO, World Economic Forum. From burden to “Best Buys”: reducing the 
economic impact of non-communicable disease in low-and middle-income 
countries. Sept 18, 2011. http://www.who.int/nmh/publications/best_
buys_summary.pdf (accessed May 1, 2018). 
4 The Coca-Cola Company. Form 10-K. Annual report pursuant to section 13 
or 15(d) of the securities exchange act of 1934. 2018 annual report. 
https://www.coca-colacompany.com/content/dam/journey/us/en/private/
fileassets/pdf/2018/2017-10K.pdf (accessed June 30, 2018).




(accessed June 30, 2018).
6 Roberto CA, Swinburn B, Hawkes C, et al. Patchy progress on obesity 
prevention: emerging examples, entrenched barriers, and new thinking. 
Lancet 2015; 385: 2400–09.
7 Gilmore AB, Fooks G, Drope J, Bialous SA, Jackson RR. Exposing and 
addressing tobacco industry conduct in low-income and middle-income 
countries. Lancet 2015; 385: 1029–43.
8 Miller D, Harkins C. Corporate strategy, corporate capture: food and alcohol 
industry lobbying and public health. Crit Soc Policy 2010; 30: 564–89.
9 Hawkins B, Holden C. A corporate veto on health policy? Global 
constitutionalism and investor-state dispute settlement. 
J Health Polit Policy Law 2016; 41: 969–95.
10 British Soft Drinks Association. BSDA’s response to the Soft Drinks Tax 
Consultation and the Childhood Obesity Strategy. Aug 17, 2016. 
https://www.britishsoftdrinks.com/Press-releases-/its-a-sad-irony-that-
the-one-category-that-has-led-the-way-in-reducing-consumers-sugar-
intake-is-being-targeted-for-a-punitive-tax (accessed May 1, 2018).
